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RUSSIAN POLITICS OF MASCULINITY AND THE DECAY OF
FEMINISM: THE ROLE OF DISSENT IN CREATING NEW
"LOCAL NORMS"
ALEXANDRA V. 0RLOVA*

ABSTRACT

Over the past decade, the Russian state has been deliberately
pursuing politics of masculinity that aim to actively undermine feminist dissenting voices by presenting feminism as something that is
foreign and inappropriate for the Russian context. This Article examines why Russian domestic feminism has failed to generate areexamination of entrenched gender stereotypes and barriers in Russia.
The Article concludes that in order to effectively combat gender
stereotyping and reduce structural barriers that continuously relegate women to the private sphere, new "local norms" based on gender
equality need to develop. In order for these new local norms to gain
public acceptance, the role of "translators," such as civil society and
domestic activists, cannot be underestimated. Unfortunately, in today's Russia, such "translation" work is highly discouraged by the
state. The Russian state is simply unwilling to cede some of its power
and account for dissent in order to advance gender equality, as opposed to its current politics of masculinity.
INTRODUCTION
I. THE MASCULINIZATION OF THE STATE AND THE DECAY
OF FEMINISM

A.

The Pussy Riot Sentencing Decision (2012)

II. CHALLENGING THE MAsCULINITY OF THE STATE
A. Gender Stereotyping: Markin v. Russia Case

B. Entrenching Patterns of Gendered Violence
CONCLUSION
INTRODUCTION

Over the past decade, the Russian state has deliberately pursued politics of masculinity that aim not only to relegate women's
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rights into the private sphere, defining them in terms of concerns
and preferences-rather than as something the state has an obligation to enforce-but also to actively undermine feminist dissenting
voices by presenting feminism as something that is foreign and
inappropriate for the Russian context. While the #MeToo movement
is gaining momentum in the West, resulting in the re-examination
of entrenched gender stereotypes and barriers, this Article examines
why Russian domestic feminism is not able to generate a similar reexamination of values within Russia.
Part I of the Article examines the gradual masculinization of the
Russian state, the rise of gendered discourses that present feminism
as a Western imposition, and the reasons for the decline of the
Russian domestic feminist movement. It looks at the sentencing
decision in the Pussy Riot case, and discusses the difficulties experienced by feminist dissenters who attempt to serve as "translators"
of Western feminist values. The Article further looks at how the
Pussy Riot decision was used to send a powerful message to Russian
human rights activists to stop challenging the state's genderized
politics. Part II looks at the position of the Russian state in regards
to "third-generation" human rights and traditional cultural norms,
vocalized as "unchangeable local culture." Part of this positioning
involves the Russian state's active perpetuation of gender stereotyping, as represented in the Markin decision by the Russian Constitutional Court. 1 The last section of Part II examines the role of the
Russian judiciary in supporting and reinforcing the state's politics
ofmasculinity, as well as the legislative perpetuation of patterns of
gender violence, by looking at the 2017 amendments to the Russian
Criminal Code that decriminalize certain forms of domestic
violence. 2 The Article concludes that in order to effectively combat
gender stereotyping and reduce the structural barriers that continuously relegate women to the private sphere, new "local norms" based
on gender equality need to develop. In order for these new local
norms to gain public acceptance, the role of "translators," such as
civil society and domestic activists, cannot be underestimated. Unfortunately, in today's Russia, such "translation" work is highly discouraged by the state. The Russian state is unwilling to cede some
of its power and account for dissent in order to advance gender
equality, as opposed to its current politics of masculinity.
1. Opredeleniye Konstitutsionnogo Suda Rossi.iskoi Federatsii ot 15 Yanvarya 2009
g [Ruling of the Russian Federation Constitutional Court of Jan. 15, 2009], GARANT.RU,
2009, No. 187-0-0.
2. See infra Section II.B.
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I. THE MAsCULINIZATION OF THE STATE AND THE
DECAY OF FE:MINISM

As President Vladimir Putin solidified his rule and reasserted
state control over many aspects ofRussian life, a gradual masculinization of the state and a decline offeminism resulted. At first, the president's masculinity was used to project the idea that he was capable of
restoring Russia's global stature. 3 However, soon ccmasculinity politics
became central to the new state-engineered mobilization."4 Gendered
discourses are deliberately used for the dual purposes of nation
building and branding, where "the border between gendered Us and
Others" is created and perpetuated. 5 For example, the government
invested heavily in the project of creating various "state-friendly''
youth groups infused with heteronormative, male-dominated ideology. 6 At the same time, many opposition movements and their leaders
were deliberately feminized and portrayed in non-heteronormative
ways, in an attempt to discredit the "moral values" of their policies
and portray them as personally weak. 7 For example, during one of
the pro-Kremlin youth camps, photoshopped pictures of various
opposition leaders dressed up as transvestite prostitutes were distributed. 8 Furthermore, given Russia's current conflict with Ukraine
over the annexation of Crimea, Russian media has actively engaged
in the ((demasculinization'' of Ukraine, by actively using gender metaphors portraying Ukraine as a "picky girl" and "flighty ... mistress,"
and generally presenting Ukraine as a state under "external control"
that is "weak, dependent, and mixed up."9 Thus, gender has been
turned into a political trigger in order to mainstream an ideology of
((traditional values."
The regime has chosen the discourse of utraditional values" to
create an "alternative intellectual space," rather than just a physical
space, for anti-Western resistance. 10 Thus, gendered discourses have
been used to maintain physical borders and possibly to expand intellectual ones, and are thus inextricably tied to Russian masculine
3. Janet Elise Johnson, Pussy Riot as a Feminist Project: Russia's Genderedlnformal
Politics,42 NATIONAIJTIES PAPERS 583, 583-85 (2014).
4. I d. at 585.
5. Liudmila Voronova, Gender Politics of the "War of Narratives": Russian TV-News
in the Times of Conflict in Ukraine, 9 CATALAN J. COMM. & CULTURAL STUD. 217, 219
(2017).
6. Johnson, supra note 3, at 585.
7. Voronova, supra note 5, at 219, 227.
8. Johnson, supra note 3, at 585.
9 . Voronova, supra note 5, at 226-27 (citation omitted).
10. I d. at 218--19, 224.
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versions of national security and the country's role in international
politics. 11 Gendered discourses are particularly useful in this creation
and demarcation of borders, because "gender discourse allows for
'humanizing' the national community, making it closer to the everyday experiences of the person and ensuring the functioning of'banal
nationalism.' "12 Given the state's heavy investment in maintaining
its "moral sovereignty'' based on "traditional values," the politics of
masculinity have been used to blame feminism for various social
problems, to perpetuate gender stereotyping, 13 and to further promote anti-Western attitudes, portraying feminism and pro-gay rights
movements as Western "moral colonialism" designed to weaken
Russia's geopolitical stance. 14 For example, "[the] construction of
neologism 'Gayropa' that appeared in the Russian discourses in the
2010s in order to point to homosexuality ... as 'the essence of the
European lifestyle,' making Europe a 'degenerate civilization' and
Russia-a 'bastion of moral principles.' "15 The politics of masculinity
certainly contributed to the 2013 federal anti-gay propaganda laws
that provide fines for "[p]ropaganda of non-traditional sexual relations among minors" and stigmatize non-reproductive sex. 16 The
politics of masculinity also gave a public platform to views that urged
women not to provoke men to rape by wearing revealing clothing. 17
Feminism was blamed for "40 million [Russian] women who do not
have husbands and experience deep unhappiness." 18 Most recently,
a video advertisement calling on Russians to vote in the presidential
elections on March 18, 2018, which went viral in Russia, painted the
"future facing those who fail to show up at the polls ... with a slew
of comically absurd laws." 19 However, "the most egregious outcome
11. Seeid.
12. ld. at 220 (quoting MICHAEL BILLIG, BANAL NATIONALISM (1995)).
13. See T A Volkova & NA. Volkov, Realizatsiya Printsipa Gendernogo Ravenstua
v Souremennoy Rossii, 19 VESTNIK KEMGUKI ZHURNAL TEORETICHESKIKH I PRIKLADNYKH
ISSLEDOVANIY 244-46 (2012) (Russ.).
14. See Oleg Riabov & Tatiana Riabova, The Remasculinization of Russia? Gender,
Nationalism, and th£ Legitimation of Power Under Vladimir Putin, 61 PROBS. POST·
COMMUNISM 23, 25, 31-32 (2014).
15. Voronova, supra note 5, at 226 (quoting Riabov & Riabova, supra note 14, at 27).
16. Federal'nyi Zakon RF o Vnesenii Izmeneniy v Stat'yu 5 Federal'nogo Zakona o
Zashchite Detey ot Informatsii Pri.chinyayushchey Vred ikh Zdorov'yu I Razvitiyu [Federal
Law on Amending Article 5 of the Federal Law on Protection of Children from Information
Harmful to Their Health and Development], RoSSIISKAIA GAZETA [Ros. GAZ.] July 2, 2013.
17. Johnson, supra note 3, at 585.
18. Id.; see also Olga Gumanova & Tatiana Barkhatova, Zhenshiny-Sushestua
Vtorogo Sorta?, PRAVDA.RU (Mar. 10, 2011, 7:19AM), https:/lwww.pravda.ru/faithlreli
gions/orthodoxy/10-03-2011/1069463-adamieva-0 [https;//perma.cc/7T8V-FU4B] (Russ.).
19. Russians Threatened with Conscription and Gay Homestays in Presidential Campaign Ad, Moscow TIMES (Feb. 19, 2018, 2:02PM), https://themoscowtimes.com/news
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of the man's decision not to vote is a law assigning each family with
a 'gay homestay' for a week." 20 In the advertisement, the man's wife
says "[i]f he doesn't find himself a pair, then you'll have to be with
him."21 "The law is the law," a flamboyantly dressed gay man says to
his host "before suggestively biting into a banana."22 The video is
clearly designed to reinforce the image of the Russian president as a
protector of heterosexual masculinity from outside threats. While the
regime has actively constructed feminism as a Western import that
has no place in Russia, concern about women's issues is certainly not
new. Domestic feminism started to take root in Russia with some local
adaptations, especially concerning issues ofviolence within families
and female poverty following the collapse of the Soviet Union. 23
The Russian feminist movement started to emerge after the
1917 Revolution, when the first Soviet Constitution formally proclaimed male and female equality in 1917.24 However, by the 1930s
the Soviet government claimed that women's issues were largely
solved.25 For seventy years of Soviet rule, each and every Soviet Constitution proclaimed a commitment to formal equality, while refusing to recognize the paternalism of power. The Soviet state, while
proclaiming its commitment to gender equality, perpetuated a division of functions between males and females and continuously used
women to solve economic and demographic problems. 26 In other
words, constitutionally prescribed gender equality did not translate
into popular cultural norms, and women were kept out of political
decision-making.27 In the 1980s women's issues were being openly
discussed, and then in the 1990s, the Russian feminist movement
experienced a period of growth.28 In part, such growth was prompted
''by grants from Western foundations, such as the Open Society
Foundation, the MacArthur Foundation, IREX, and the Fulbright
lrussians-threatened-with-conscription-gay-homestays-presidential-campaign-ad-60555
[https://perma.ccJQ7JC-D58J]. For instance, the video depicts a "52-year-old man dream[ing] that he is drafted into a multi-ethnic army, harassed by a communist son for donations and forced to limit his daily number of bathroom visits." Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Johnson, supra note 3, at 586.
24. Volkova & Volkov, supra note 13, at 243.
25. Id.
26. N.L. Pushkareva, Gde Bolshe Vlasti---Tam Men'she Zhenschin (Gendemaya

Eksperliza Zakonodatelstua I Tekuschei Zakonotvorcheskoi Deyatel'nosti Vysshih Organov
Vlasti RF 1991-2006 gg), 1 NAUCHNYE VEDOMOSTI BELGU SER. ISTORIYA POIJTOLOGIYA.
EKONOMIKA. !NFORMATIKA 118--19

(2008) (Russ.).
27. Id. at 119.
28. Natalia Pushkareva & Maria Zolotukhina, Women's and Gender Studies of the
Russian Past: Two Contemporary Trends, 27 WoMEN'S HIST. REv. 71, 76 (2018).
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program."29 However, the 2000s saw the decline of feminism in particular, and Western ideas more generally, in Russian socio-legal
consciousness, especially as the Russian state commenced its pursuit of a "traditional values" campaign and enacted laws designating
NGOs, receiving Western funding, as "foreign agents." 3°Currently,
the only women's rights NGOs allowed to operate in Russia, without
harassment and intimidation, are ones dedicated to the study and
support of families with a traditional division of roles and to stemming the integration of Western ideas into Russian women's movements and academic research. 31 The state is actively engaged in
propagating the idea that the main function of the family is reproductive.32 State crackdown on foreign-funded NGOs is pursued with
the explicit purpose of rendering unacceptable "Western 'permissive'
attitudes towards sexual minorities, gay marriage, small families
and reduced fertility as well as feminism itself." 33
While the Russian Constitution continues the tradition of proclaiming gender equality in s.19(3), 34 Russian popular culture keeps
voicing the idea that feminism is "not normal," as "normaf' women
should prefer family and children over the struggle for rights and
equality with men.35 The Russian state, through various pronatalist
policies, 36 is actively trying to bring women within the framework of
marriage and reinforce the idea that all female relationships with
the state should be mediated through the prism of marriage, which
in tum is based on a model of male provider and female dependent.
In a sense, the state is attempting to insert heterosexual marriage
based on "traditional values" as a "necessary part of women's public
legal identities." 37 Feminism remains increasingly marginalized in
29. Id.
30. Federafnyi Zakon RF o Vnesenii Izmeneniy v Otdel'nyye Zakonodatel'nyye Akty

Rossiiskoi Federatsii v Chasti Regulirovaniya Deyatel'nosti Nek.ommercheskikh Organizatsiy, Vypolnyayushchikh Funktsii Inostrannogo Agenta [Federal Law on Amending Certain
Legislative Acts of the Russian Federation Regarding Regulation of Activities of NonProfit Organizations Performing the Functions of a Foreign Agent], RossnsKAIA GAZETA
[Ros. GAZ.] July 23,2012.
31. Pushk:areva & Zolotukhina, supra note 28, at 79.
32. Vladimir M. Puchnin & Sergei V. Shunyaev, Znachenie Definitsii, Sostavlyauschih

Ponyatie "Nasilie v Sem'e," Kak Asotsial'nogo Yavleniya, Posyagauschego na Svobodu
Lichnosti, 12 VESTNIK TAMBOVSKOGO UNIVERSITETA. SERIYA: GUMANITARNYYE NAUKI
310, 313-14 (2010) (Russ.).

33. Pushkareva & Zolotukhina, supra note 28, at 79 (footnote omitted).
34. Push.k:areva, supra note 26, at 121-22.
35. Olga Voronina, Has Feminist Philosophy a Future in Russia? 34 SIGNS 252, 252
(2009).
36. Ariela Dubler et al., Women$ Rights: Reframing the Issues for the Future, 12
COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 333, 339 (2003).
37. Id. at 339-40, 350.
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Russia, and explicit anti-feminist statements are heard more and
more frequently. 38 Russian women's organizations prefer to engage
in issue-specific struggles, such as helping victims of family violence,
or even the struggle for labour rights, but they do not generally engage in critiquing structural discrimination and gender stereotyping
against women in Russian society. 39 Russian women academics, researchers, and activists remain, for the most part, excluded from
global feminist and gender networks.40 Some Russian women's organizations also feel that receiving foreign donor money, and being
told how to shape and proceed with their agendas, involve echoes of
imperialism, and thus, should be avoided. 41 This critique is not just
a point of pride, but is in part shaped by granting history ofthe 1990s,
leading to the perception that:
fads and fashions of donors' changing priorities for fundingsuch as first supporting work connected with domestic violence
and crisis centres and then switching away from them to call for
attention to human trafficking--often means just short-term
backing for serious projects before further redefinition, thus leaving organizations without help unless they hastily remodel or
repackage themselves. 42

Thus, few grants coming from foreign donors are seen as actually
enabling activists to address, in a sustained fashion, the structural
forms of discrimination experienced by Russian women.
In response to these local manifestations of feminism, the regime
invested heavily in attracting high-profile women into the Russian
political landscape; however, women in government are often" 'showgirls,' a feminized version of 'locomotives,' a widespread informal
practice of nominating big names, such as celebrities, singers and
athletes (including a ballerina, a rhythmic gymnast and a former
Playboy model) to attract voters, some of whom then decline to
serve."43 In other words, women are included for the sake of appearances and are frequently used to promote anti-feminist initiatives.
For example, Russian Parliamentarian, Yelena Mizulina, has promoted both the anti-gay propaganda law and the amendments
38. Pushkareva & Zolotukhina, supra note 28, at 79.
39. Voronina, supra note 35, at 254.
40. ld.
41. Amrita Basu, Who Secures Women~ Capabilities in Martha Nussbaum's Quest
for Social Justice? 19 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 201, 201, 204 (2010).
42. Mary Buckley, The Politics Surrounding Gender Issues and Domestic Vwlence in
Russia: What Is to Be Done, By Whom and How? J. CO:MMUNIST STUD. & TRANSITION POL.
435, 442 (2010).
43. Johnson, supra note 3, at 587--88 (citation omitted).
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decriminalizing certain instances of domestic violence, while Parliamentarian Yekaterina Lakhova has lobbied for Russia's infamous
anti-Magnitsky (Dima Yakovlev) law.44 This law creates a list of
foreigners banned from entering Russia, suspends the activity of
NGOs receiving foreign funding, and bans United States' citizens
from adopting Russian children. 45 The public perception of politics
remains genderized (i.e., politics are seen as the domain ofmen).46
Apart from a few prominent high-positioned women, women in
Russian civil service tend to be concentrated in positions where they
do not make significant political decisions. 47 At the same time, civil
service attracts a significant share of women, who in turn, become
dependent on the state for their economic survival, and hence,
reluctant to challenge genderized state policies. In a sense, women
are co-opted into the politics of masculinity pursued by the regime
and rewarded for their loyalty. Those who refuse to play by the rules
and argue against the mainstream establishment are punished and
delegitimized.48 A recent sexual harassment scandal, involving several
Russian female journalists and a State Duma deputy, illustrated the
pervasiveness of this phenomenon in Russian genderized politics. 49
The international incident around the women in Pussy Riot,
who staged a "punk prayer'' in the Cathedral of Christ the Saviour in
Moscow, and their subsequent trial and harsh prison sentences, illustrate the states' severe response to those challenging its vision of
Russia's moral stance and to women "behaving in unfeminine ways."50
44. See The Dima Yakovlev Law: Ethical Implications of the Russian Adoption Ban,
GEOHISTORY (Sept. 1, 2013), https://www.geohistory.today/dima-yakovlev-law-ethics
[https://perma.cdMYY7-8RSB]; Shaun Walker, Fury at Russian Move to Soften Domestic
Vwlence Law, GUARDIAN (Jan. 19, 2017, 9:56 PM), https:/lwww.theguardian.com/world
/20 17/jan/19/russian-soften-domestic-violence-law-decriminali.se-womens-rights [https://
perma.cdGEP2-N2BH]; see, e.g., Sewell Chan, Russia$ 'Gay Propaganda'Laws Are Illegal,
European Court Rules, N.Y. TIMES (June 20, 2017), https:/lwww.nytimes.com/2017/06/20
lworld/europe/russia-gay-propaganda.html [https://perma.cdE49N-EL66]; Mary Zelenova,
Invisible Children: Russia's Dima Yakovleu Law, NAOC (Feb. 1, 2017), http://natoasso
ciation.calinvisible-children-russias-dima-yakovlev-law [https://perma.cc!H8UV-VTGH].
45. Federal'nyi Zakon RF o Merakh Vozdeystviya na Lits, Prichastnykh k Narusheniyam Osnovopolagayushchikh Prav I Svobod Cheloveka, Prav I Svobod Grazhdan
Rossiyskoy Federatsii [Federal Law On Measures to Influence Individuals Involved In
Violations of Fundamental Human Rights and Freedoms, Rights and Freedoms of
Citizens of the Russian Federation], ROSSIISKAIA GAZETA [Ros. GAZ.] Dec. 29, 2012.
46. Pushkareva, supra note 26, at 122.
47. ld. at 123.
48. ld. at 124.
49. Oksana Pushkina, Russian Deputy Vows to Criminalize Sexual Harassment After
Duma Scandal, Moscow TIMES (Feb. 27, 2018, 3:02 PM), https:/lthemoscowtimes.com
/news/russian-deputy-vows-criminalize-sexual-harassment-after-duma-scandal-60640
[https://perma.cc/KH2U-GRE5].
50. Peter Rutland, The Pussy Riot Affair: Gender and National Identity in Putin's
Russia, 42 NATIONALITIES PAPERS 575, 575, 579 (2014).
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Those challenging the states' vision present an asymmetrical challenge to the states' carefully cultivated "legitimacy ... based on a
heavily masculinized image."51
A. The Pussy Riot Sentencing Decision (2012)

The Pussy Riot case stems from the arrest of three women in
March of 2012. 52 Nadezhda Tolokonnikova, Maria Alekhina, and
Yekaterina Samutsevich were charged with criminal hooliganism
motivated by religious hatred. 53 On the morning of February 21,
2012, several women entered Christ the Saviour Cathedral in Moscow.54 Upon entering the cathedral, they dumped their backpacks in
a pile, took off their outerwear to reveal short colourful dresses, put
balaclavas on their faces, crossed the gate separating the nave from
the iconostasis and altar, plugged in an amplifier for an electric
guitar, and began singing and dancing. 55 On August 17, 2012, the
three women were convicted and each sentenced to two years of imprisonment. 56 Witnesses called by the court and the accused disagreed about the lyrics. 57 The accused women claimed that they said
"Holy Mother, drive out Putin" and "Holy Mother, become a feminist."118 The prosecution's witnesses claimed that the women cursed
and insulted God and the Church.5 9
In addition to the content of the accused's lyrics, the inappropriate dresses, and the behavior, most of the prosecution's witnesses
were "particularly dismayed that women had violated a sacred space
reserved exclusively for men" and strongly objected to that fact. 60 All
of the prosecution's witnesses testified that there was nothing
political in the women's words, actions, or gestures, and all their
actions were premeditated, malicious blasphemy, designed to attract media attention, including foreign media. 61 The witnesses for
51. ld. at 579.
52. Id. at 577.
53. Id.
04. Rutland, supra note 50, at 576; see also Prigovor Pussy Riot, SNOB.RU 24, 24
(Aug. 22, 2012), https://snob.ru/selectedlentry/51999 [https://perma.cc/5LLK-ZSJC].
55. Prigovor Pussy Riot, supra note 54, at 27.
56. Pussy Riot v. Russia, CaseNo.1-170/ 12 (Aug. 17, 2012), http:/lglobalfreedomofex
pression.columbia.edu/caseslpussy-riot-vs-russia [https://perma.cc/M7PW-PBDH]; see
also Rutland, supra note 50, at 577.
57. Catherine Schuler, Reinventing the Show Trial Putin and Pussy Riot, 57 TDR 7,
11 (2013).
58. Prigovor Pussy Riot, supra note 54, at 25.
59. Seeid.
60. Schuler, supra note 57, at 12.
61. Id.
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the defense were more harmful than helpful to the accused's case. 62
Most of the witnesses limited themselves to short generic statements
that the accused were good students, good mothers, and not aggressive
in their interactions. 63 Yekaterina Samutsevich's father stated that he
was surprised that his daughter-who was always a good girl until
she fell under the influence of Nadezhda Tolokonnikova--decided to
follow feminism. 64 He stated that, in his view, feminism is antithetical
to Russian civilization and is for the West, not for Russia.65 Another
point of note is that the judgment makes it clear in its description of
the collected evidence, that only Nadezhda Tolokonnikova's apartment
was searched. 66 The judgment, on several occasions, emphasizes
that during the search of Tolokonnikova's apartment, which she
shared with her husband, the police located a Canadian passport held
by her husband and Tolokonnikova's Canadian permanent resident
card, as well as her Canadian Social Insurance Number and provincial health card.67 Thus, the court strongly implied the possibility of
"foreign influence."68
In their response to the accusations of hate crimes, the women,
especially Tolokonnikova, argued that they were not motivated by
religious hatred, but rather, were trying to mount a political protest
in an artistic form. 69 Their main complaints included the suppression of dissent by the Russian state, anti-gay propaganda laws, and
the inappropriate support by the Church ofPutin's presidency. 70 The
women also objected to traditional patriarchal families, where women
are deemed less important and subordinate to men. 71 This objection
to patriarchy is what motivated the women to enter the area of the
Church-traditionally reserved for men-and to call for the Mother
of God to become a feminist. 72 N adezhda Tolokonnikova, arguably
the most vocal of Pussy Riot's members, stated:
[w]ho could have supposed that history, in particular the still
recent history of Stalin's terror, would not be taught at all? It
makes you want to weep, looking at how methods of the medieval inquisition reign over security and judicial systems in the
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.

Seeid.
Seeid.
Prigovor Pussy Riot, supra note 54, at 33.
ld.
ld. at 34-35.
Id.
Schuler, supra note 57, at 13.
Id. at 12.
See Prigovar Pussy Riot, supra note 54, at 26.
ld.
See id. at 39.
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Russian Federation, which is our country. From the moment of
our arrest we could not weep anymore, we have forgotten how to
cry; we shouted in despair at our punk concerts, as we could and
as we knew how, about the lawlessness of bosses and of power,
but now they've stolen our voices. 73

The court concluded that the accused's actions were motivated
by hatred for Orthodox believers and caused significant emotional
and moral damage to the employees and parishioners present in the
Church on the day of the "punk prayer," as well as to every Christian globally who saw the video posted on the Internet. 74 The court's
conclusions completely discounted the artistic and political nature
of the accused's actions. Moreover, the court's conclusion about the
presence of religious hatred seemed, in part, to be based on a negative view of feminism. Specifically, the court stated that:
[c]urrently, individuals following the feminist movement are fighting for gender equality in political, family, and sexual relations.
While following the ideology of feminism does not constitute a
crime or another type of an offence in the Russian Federation, a
number of religions, such as Orthodoxy, Catholicism, and Islam,
cannot be reconciled with the ideas of feminism. While feminism
does not represent a religious ideology, the followers of feminism
are interfering with such public spheres as public morals, norms of
propriety, family relations, and sexual relations, all ofwhich have
been historically built on the basis of religious principles. Thus,
espousing the superiority of one ideology over others, leads to hate
and strife. This hate, including religious hate, has been conclusively proven as a motivation behind the actions ofthe accused. 75

In this way, the court's judgment makes it clear that feminism, and
those who espouse it, will be viewed as undermining the state's
concept of public good, and will be dealt with harshly.
Despite the portrayals of the women from Pussy Riot as engaging in behaviour that was not only "un-Russian" in its open alignment with feminism, but also possibly subversive of Russian national
security-some claiming that it was catering directly to Western
audiences and influences-the idea of the artistic and intellectual
community standing up to the state has deep roots in Russian
culture, in both the pre-revolutionary and Soviet periods. 76 As one
73.
74.
75.
76.

Schuler, supra note 57, at 15 (citation omitted).
See Prigouor Pussy Riot, supra note 54, at 27.
I d. at 40 (translated by author).
See Pushkareva, supra note 26, at 80.
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author put it, "the lack of space for critical political action in the
public sphere meant that the responsibility for questioning authority
fell to artists and writers.'m However, it is also clear that the Pussy
Riot trial was predetermined to focus on religion, and by extension
on reasserting Russia's moral sovereignty and superiority over the
West, rather than examining politics and art.78 In the end, the Pussy
Riot trial was used by the Russian state to highlight and reinforce
its anti-Western stance, in part, due to the fact that the pro-feminist
attitudes of Pussy Riot members were perceived by the Russian
general public as part of a Western conspiracy to weaken Russia.
However, Western feminist thinking has not penetrated Russian
society. In a sense,
Pussy Riot became evidence for the threat posed by the West's
moral nihilism, undermining the "Orthodox majority" that was
portrayed as representing the core of the Russian nation. There
was indeed a conspiracy afoot--but it was one orchestrated by
the Russian state, against the opposition. 79

One of the key reasons that the women of Pussy Riot received such
severe treatment was their questioning ofthe masculinized heteronormative campaign for "traditional values," and their attempting to
serve as "translators" of Western feminist values, by vernacularizing
those values for a Russian audience. After all, "[t]he transformation
of the 'other's' concept into 'your own' (including the transformation of
the 'other's' feminism in its Russian version) must take the form of
an individual interiorization of some of its concepts."80 The Russian
state is determined to suppress such dissenting voices, and hence,
the women of Pussy Riot were cynically used by the state to send a
message to both Western human rights campaigners and Russian
human rights activists.81

II. CHALLENGING THE MASCULINITY OF THE STATE
Following the Pussy Riot case, President Putin, in his December
2013 state of the nation address, declared that many Western countries are determined to redefine moral norms and erase national
77. Rutland, supra note 50, at 576.
78. Id. at 577.
79. I d. at 581.
80. Push.k.areva & Zolotukhina, supra note 28, at 79.
81. See Brian Whitmore, Vladimir Putin, Conservative Icon, ATLANTIC (Dec. 20, 2013),
https:/lwww .theatlantic.com/international/archive/2013/12/vladimir-putin-conservative
-icon/282572 [https://perma.cc/F2V4-EWQ2].
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traditions and cultural differences. 82 This forces societies not only to
recognize perfectly legitimate rights protecting freedom ofconscience,
political freedom, and private life, but also to equate good and evil
due to the undermining of traditional values. Putin stated that it is
Russia's duty to protect traditional values, including traditional
families. 83 Putin also noted that the world supports Russia's "defense of traditional values" against "genderless and infertile" tolerance. 84 Such position taken by the Russian President, and echoed by
prominent Russian politicians, inevitably makes the assumption
that the concept of "traditional values" is an easily definable one
and, moreover, that it is stable.85 In reality, the sustainability and
stability of these concepts are secured by those who get to tell the
story, and thus, determine the definition of the truth.86 The Russian
state is deliberately engaging in "confirming the normality of the
Selfby naming the deviance of the Other."87 This Russian positioning, regarding certain human rights, such as gender equality, is not
uncommon, since "[t]hose who resist human rights often claim to be
defending culture." 88 Local norms, of course, are not necessarily
''bounded, immutable, and well settled."89 Nonetheless, if cultural
norms are constantly presented and conceptualized as immutable,
this impacts how social change is imagined by both the state and
those involved in social movements. 90
The Russian state has certainly propagated the idea of an
unchangeable local culture, and has positioned itself as a defender
of this culture, and by extension of the Russian people, from harmful
outside influences. The Pussy Riot case provides a powerful illustration of state resistance to the idea of feminism and the promotion of
"traditional family" pronatalist policies.91 Despite the Russian state's
82. See id.; N.S. Semenova, Traditsionnye Tsennosti v. "Prava LGBT' V Ramkah
Realizatsii Prava Na Obrazovanie: Mezhdunarodno-Pravivoi Podhod, 6 VESTNIK RUDN
82, 86 (2016) [in Russian].
83. Semenova, supra note 82, at 86-87.
84. Marko Duman, Russia's Conservative "Family Values" Are a Sham, Moscow
TIMES (Sept. 7, 2014, 6:09PM), http://themoscowtimes.com/articles/russias-conservative
-family-values-are-a-sham-39115 [https://perma.cc/2VAN-VWVC].
85. Semenova, supra note 82, at 86-87.
86. See generally Daniel H. Kaiser, "He Said, She Said'~ Rape and Gender Discourse
in Early Modern Russia, 3 KRITIKA: EXPLORATIONS IN RUSSIAN AND EURASIAN HIST. 197,
197 (2002), https://muse.jhu.edu/article/187 41/pdf.
87. Ralph Sandland, Crossing and Not Crossing: Gender, Sexuality and Melancholy
in the European Court of Human Rights, 11 FEMINIST LEGAL STUD. 191, 203 (2003).
88. Sally Engle Merry, Human Rights and Transnational Culture: Regulating Gender
Violence Through Global Law, 44 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 53, 60 (2006).
89. I d. at 64 (footnote omitted).
90. ld.
91. Duman, supra note 84.
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repeated declarations of maintaining and defending "traditional
values," these values are built on a rather shaky foundation. Russia,
for instance, has one of the highest divorce rates in the world.92 Its
abortion rate, similarly, remains one of the highest.93 Working mothers and single mothers are a normalized phenomenon in Russian
society.94 Moreover, despite its public condemnation ofhomosexuality, "Russia's public space is no stranger to cross-dressing, drag, and
unorthodox gender-bending," especially when it comes to the Russian entertainment scene. 95 However, despite recurring challenges
to the state's "traditional values" discourse, these values continue
to be propagated by the Russian state through its repeated emphasis on the inferiority of so-called third-generation human rights,
which include various collective rights as well as women's rights. 96
As third-generation rights, such as gender equality, come into increasing conflict with first-generation civil and political rights, the
discourse of"traditional values" and "cultural norms" is utilized to
discount the legitimacy of women's claims and to protect the status
quo.97 After all, while s.19 of the Russian Constitution guarantees
formal gender equality, women in Russia face a multitude of structural barriers. 98 In part, such barriers persist due to women's rights
and gender equality being deemed secondary and subservient to
first-generation civil and political rights, which are targeted much
more at protecting males from state interference within the public
realm, than females within the private realm, where the rhetoric of
"traditional values" continuously pushes women. 99
One of the key issues when it comes to advancing change and
changing public perceptions of women's rights and feminism is that,
when cultural norms are perceived as absolutist, the struggle to
change such norms becomes that much more difficult. Hence, socalled "translators" or "intermediaries" (people who live and navigate between multiple systems) become key to achieving change.
The role of such individuals is critical as "human rights ideas are
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Natalia Antonova, No Way Back for Russian Women, Moscow TIMES (Nov. 5,
2015, 4:11 PM), https://themoscowtimes.oom/articles/8198no-way-back-for-russian-women
-50650 [https://perma.cc/99DT-HV6H]; see also P.U. Kapustina et al., Gendernye Stereotipy u Studencheskoi Srede, J. SIBERIANMED. SCI. 1, 7 (2014) (Russ.).
95. Duman, supra note 84.
96. See N.A. Volkov & T .A. Volkova, Problemy Realizatsii Gendemoi Strategii Rossii
u Kontekste "Pokolenii" Prav Cheloueka, 29 VESTNIK KEMGUKI 1, 101 (2014) (Russ.).
97. See id. at 1024>4.
98. Seeid.
99. Natsu Taylor Saito, Considering 'Third Generation"International Human Rights
Law in the United States, 28 U . MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REv. 387, 398 (1997).
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appropriated, encouraged, and resisted in many locations around the
world." 100 Within Russia, various voices of dissent continue to challenge the state's masculinized vision of Russian society. For example,
in 2016, thousands of women in Ukraine, Russia, and Belarus went
on social media to share their experiences of sexual violence in the
''#IAm.NotA:fraidToSpeak" flash mob. 101 A number of prominent
Russian women joined this flash mob to share their stories and to
start challenging the blaming of female victims. 102 While this flash
mob drew widespread support on the Internet, it also attracted
significant backlash on social media, claiming that the flash mob
was caused by the desire for "cheap popularity and attention." 103
Moreover, various church figures stated that stories of sexual violence should not be posted on the Internet, and that some female
activists "suffer[ed] from 'exhibitionism,"' since information about
sexual violence should not be made public. 104 The flash mob organizer's Facebook account was also suspended. 105 The politics of
masculinity pursued by the Russian state, and its insistence on traditional values and local cultural norms, demonstrate that there are
"fissures between the global settings where human rights ideas are
codified into documents and the local communities where the subjects of these rights live and work." 106 If the idea of gender equality
is to be translated into concrete action and have an impact, it would
need to become "part of the consciousness of ordinary people," 107
which the state is actively preventing at this point in time.

A. Gender Stereotyping: Markin v. Russia Case
Part of the Russian state's static approach to human rights, especially third-generation rights, and the suppression of dissent by equating dissenters with harmful foreign influences, involves continuous
100. Merry, supra note 88, at 55.
101. Mikhail Fislurum, Russia's Unstoppable Desire for Change, Moscow TIMES
(July 5, 2017, 4:07PM), http://themoscowtimes.com/articles/russias-unstoppable-desire
-for-change-58301 [https://perma.cdLNG5-W7QZ].
102. Katie Davies & Maria Evdokimova, I Am Not Afraid to Speak: Russian Online
Flash Mob Condemns Sexual Violence, MoscowTIMEs (July 11, 201612:07PM), http://
themoscowtimes.comlarticles/i -am-not-afraid-to-speak-russian-online-flash-mob-con
demns-sexual-violence-54519 [https://perma.cc/3P2M-5FD9].
103. ld.
104. Valerie Kipnis, Russian Orthodox Church Responds to Women Who ·~e Not
Afraid to Speak," MOSCOW TIMES (July 14, 2016, 7:32PM), http://themoscowtimes.com/ar
ticles/russian-orthodox-church-responds-to-women-who-are-not-afraid-to-speak-54590
[https://perma.cc/65XS-DTJ5].
105. Id.
106. Merry, supra note 88, at 57.
107. ld.
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state support for gender stereotyping. 108 Gender stereotyping is
certainly not unique to the Russian context. 109 Myths and gender
stereotypes frequently permeate values and laws, especially when
it comes to women's capacity for roles other than motherhood. 110
Within the Russian context, gender stereotyping is ubiquitous in
public discourse. m The Russian state frequently resorts to stereotyping in order to justify the various human rights infringements
under the guise of traditional values. 112 Additionally, the state and
judiciary continually reinforces popular views regarding women
being primarily concerned with motherhood and childrearing, and
men being dedicated to providing for the family economically .113 A
good illustration of judicial approaches to gender stereotyping is
provided by the case of Markin u. Russia. 114
Konstantin Markin was a Russian military serviceman, serving
as a radio intelligence operator. 115 Markin divorced his wife, and they
entered into an agreement under which the three children of the
marriage would live with Markin. 116 He asked the head of his military unit for three years' parentalleave. 117 The head of the military
unit rejected Markin's request, because such leave could only be
granted to female militazy personnel.118 As a male, Markin was entitled to three months' leave. 119 Markin brought proceedings against
his military unit before a military court. 120 Once his claim was dismissed, he brought an appeal in front of a military appeals court. 121
The military appeals court upheld the decision of the first-instance
court denying Markin parental leave, and stated that Markin's
"reflections on equality between men and women ... [could] not
108. See Alexandra Timmer, Judging Stereotypes: What the European Court of Human
Rights Can Borrow from American and Canadian Equal Protection Law, 63AM. J. COMP.
L. 239, 282 (2015).
109. ld.
110. ld.
111. G.V. Zhigunova & N.O. Ponomarenko, Princhiny Nasiliya nad Zhenschinami v
Sem'e,IZVESTIYAVYSSHIKHUCHEBNYKHZAVEDNIYPOVOIZHSKIYREGION,34Soc.Sci137,

140 (2015) (Russ.).
112. See Kapustina et al., supra note 94, at 5-6, 9.
113. Id.
114. See generally Oprend.eleniye Konstitutsionnogo Sud Rossiyskoy Federastii
[Ruling of the Russian Federation Constitutional Court], RossrrsKAIA GAZETA [Roz. Gaz]
Jan. 15, 2009; Markin v. Russia, 2012-III Eur. Ct. H.R.; Markin v. Russia, 2010-1 Eur.
Ct. H.R.
115. Markin, 2012-III Eur. Ct. H.R. at 85.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. I d. at 85.
120. ld.
121. Markin, 2012-III Eur. Ct. H.R. at 85.
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serve as a basis for quashing the first-instance judgment, which
[was] correct in substance." 122
Markin then applied to the Russian Constitutional Court, claiming that the provisions of Russia's Military Service Act, concerning
the three-year parental leave, were "incompatible with the equality
clause in the Constitution."123 The Russian Constitutional Court, in
its judgment of January 15, 2009, rejected his application. 124 The
Constitutional Court emphasized the close connection between military service and public interest, and hence the entitlement offederal
legislators to place limitations on the civil rights and freedoms of
military personnel.125 The Court further stated that "by signing a
military-service contract a citizen ... voluntarily chooses a professional activity which entails ... limitations on his civil rights and
freedoms inherent in this type of public service." 126
The Court went on to emphasize that a serviceman under contract is entitled to a leave of up to three months under certain
circumstances, the purpose of such leave being to give him time to
make arrangements for the care of his child, or to decide whether he
wishes to take advantage of an early discharge for family reasons. 127
Finally, the Constitutional Court stated that:
[o]wing to the specific demands of military service, non-performance of military duties by military personnel en masse must be
excluded as it might be detrimental to the public interests protected by law.... By granting, on an exceptional basis, the right
to parental leave to servicewomen only, the legislature took into
account, firstly, the limited participation of women in military
service and, secondly, the special role of women associated with
motherhood.128

The Court concluded that, in light of the above reasons, giving differential leave to men and women cannot be regarded as breaching the
principles of gender equality established by Article 19, Sections 2
and 3 of the Russian Constitution. 129
Following the refusal by the Russian Constitutional Court to
consider Markin's application, he lodged an application with the
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.

I d. at 88.
I d. at 88--89.
I d. at 89.
Id.
ld.
Markin, 2012-III Eur. Ct. H.R. at 89.
ld. at 90.
ld.
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European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR).u10 The Chamber of the
ECtHR, in its October 7, 2010 judgment, found that there had been
a violation of Article 14 (prohibition of discrimination) of the European Convention on Human Rights in conjunction with Article 8
(respect for private and family life) of the Convention. 131 The ECtHR
concluded that the denial of parental leave to Markin was based on
both his military status and sex. 132 The ECtHR stated that advancement of gender equality is considered to be a major goal in the
member States ofthe Council ofEurope, and thus, states have a small
margin of appreciation when it comes to this issue and would need
to provide very weighty reasons to justify gender-based differences
in treatment. 133 The Court was not convinced by the Russian Constitutional Court's argument that, when it came to parental leave, the
difference in treatment between servicemen and servicewomen was
justified by the special role of mothers in the upbringing of children. 134
The ECtHR concluded that when it comes to taking care of children
during parental leave, both parents are "similarly placed." 135 The
Court noted that the "European consensus" towards a more equal
sharing of responsibilities for the upbringing of children cannot be
overlooked when it comes to this issue. 136 The ECtHR also pointed
out that references to "the traditional perception of women as primary child-carers" do not provide sufficient justification for excluding fathers from taking parentalleave. 137
As for Markin's military status, the Court pointed out that
military personnel do not automatically waive their rights under the
European Convention on Human Rights by virtue of joining the
armed forces. 138 The ECtHR was not convinced by the arguments of
the Russian Constitutional Court that the extension ofparental leave
to servicemen would have a negative effect on the fighting power
and operational effectiveness of the armed forces. 139 The ECtHR
compared the arguments of the Russian Constitutional Court to the
argument made in Smith & Grady v. United Kingdom regarding the
presence of homosexuals in the army, that homosexuals undermine
its operational effectiveness. 140 In both cases, there was a lack of
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.

See Markin v. Russia, 2010-I Eur. Ct. H.R. at 4.
I d. at 19; see also Markin, 2012-III Eur. Ct. H. R. at 102--03.
Markin, 2012-III Eur. Ct. H.R. at 13--14.
I d. at 114; see also Markin, 2010-1 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 13.
See Markin, 2012-III Eur. Ct. H.R. at 115.
Id.
Markin, 2010-I Eur. Ct. H.R. at 14.
Id. at 15.
Id.
ld. at 16--17.
I d. at 16; Markin, 2012-III Eur. Ct. H.R. at 106.
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concrete evidence to substantiate such conclusions. 141 Finally, the
Court noted that neither gender-based prejudices based on the perception of women as caregivers and men as breadwinners, nor the
fact that women were less numerous in the Russian armed forces,
justified disadvantaged treatment of servicemen in relation to parental
leaves. 142 Finally, the ECtHR noted that the provisions of Russia's
Military Service Act produced a widespread problem impacting a
substantial number ofpeople, and recommended amendments to the
Military Service Act to put an end to discrimination. 143
The 2010 decision by the Chamber of the ECtHR prompted a
strong response by the chairman ofthe Russian Constitutional Court,
Valery Zorkin. He argued that:
[the] priority in defining the public interest must reside in the
state and its authorities, not international judges .... He further challenged the chamber's position that considering women
the primary caretakers of small children was just a "gender
stereotype." Instead, the special role of mothers in raising their
children was supported by contemporary psychology. Zorkin also
criticized the chamber's reliance on the earlier decision in Smith
& Grady u. United Kingdom, which concerned the rights of homosexual men in the army, arguing that the preoccupation of contemporary European lawyers with homosexual rights was taking
"grotesque forms" that sometimes turned into a "tragedy."144

It is thus not surprising that the Russian government requested
that the case be referred to the Grand Chamber of the ECtHR, which
issued its judgment on March 22, 2012. 145
The Grand Chamber of the ECtHR upheld the earlier judgment
of the Chamber, and similarly concluded that there had been a violation of Article 14 in conjunction with Article 8 of the Convention. 146
Once again, the ECtHR emphasized the importance of "European
consensus" in its decisions. 147 The Strasbourg Court stated that "the
advancement of gender equality is today a major goal in the member
States of the Council of Europe." 148 Regarding the argument about
the special role of women in the raising of children, the Court noted
141. Markin, 2012-III Eur. Ct. H.R. at 106.
142. ld. at 119.
143. See id. at 119-21.
144. Lauri Malksoo, International Decisions: Markin v. Russia, 106AM. J. INT'L L. 836,
839--40 (2012).
145. See generally Markin, 2012-III Eur. Ct. H.R.
146. Id. at 126.
147. ld. at 103.
148. ld. at 114.
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a gradual evolution of society towards a more equal sharing of responsibility between men and women for the upbringing of children. 149
The Russian government's characterization of the provisions allowing
parental leave for female military personnel but not male military
personnel as ''positive discrimination'' is misconooived. 160 Furthermore,
the court noted that the differential treatment was "clearly not intended to correct the disadvantaged position of women in society." 151
Quite the opposite, such a difference in treatment has the effect of
perpetuating gender stereotyping and is "disadvantageous both to
women's careers and to men's family life." 152 The Court also explicitly rejected reference to prevailing traditions in a country as a justification for the difference in treatment; hence, the perception of women
as primarily responsible for providing child care and men primarily
as breadwinners cannot be considered a sufficient justification. 153
The Court was not persuaded by the Russian government's
argument that the extension of parental leave to servicemen would
compromise the fighting power and operational effectiveness of the
armed forces, while the granting ofparentalleave to servicewomen
would not pose similar risks due to women being less numerous in
the military. 154 The Russian government failed to present sufficient
expert studies or statistical research to justify its claim. 155 While the
ECtHR considered that "it may be justifiable to exclude from the
entitlement to parental leave any personnel, male or female, who
may not be easily replaced" due to the nature of their duties-such
as "hierarchical position, rare technical qualifications or involvement
in active military actions"-in Russia, the entitlement to parental
leave depended solely on the sex of the military personnel. 156 Finally, in relation to the Russian government's argument that Mr.
Markin waived his right not to be discriminated against by voluntarily signing a military contract, the Court stated that "in view of
the fundamental importance of the prohibition of discrimination on
grounds of sex, nowaiverofthe right not to be subjected to discrimination on such grounds can be accepted as it would be counter to an
important public interest."157 The difference in treatment of servicemen and servicewomen with regards to parental leave could not be
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.

Id. at 117.
Id. at 118.
Markin, 2012-III Eur. Ct. H.R. at 118.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 119.
Id.
ld. at 121.
Markin, 2012-III Eur. Ct. H.R. at 122 (citation omitted).
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"reasonably or objectively justified," and thus "amounted to discrimination on [the] grounds of sex."158
The case of Markin v. Russia makes it clear that in the Russian
context, not only is gender stereotyping prevalent in public discourse,
but the discourse is also deliberately being shaped by both the
Russian state and the Russian courts. A key problem with stereotypes is that they are taken for granted, to the extent that they are
almost invisible. 159 Hence, in order to make stereotypes visible,
society must engage in a conscious process of naming and exposing
said stereotypes. 160 In other words, a conscious shift needs to occur
from an excessive focus on women's biological capacity, toward viewing
women as "full human beings and equal members of society ."161 In
order for such a shift to occur, in addition to explicitly naming
stereotypes and examining their underlying assumptions, so-called
"private rights" need to be taken seriously by the state, rather than
discounted. Conceptualizing women's rights as falling within private
life and the private sphere risks creating dangerous private spaces,
where women are left alone with no recourse. 162 Thus, explicitly
acknowledging the ways in which laws and practices deprive women
of choices, control, and dignity is essential to "women's issues" being
viewed as rights to be protected and guaranteed, rather than merely
moral questions that are part of "traditional values."
One of the ways that gender stereotyping can be recognized is
through transformative judicial narratives. Legal reasoning "can expose and target the invidious cycle wherein stereotyping and discrimination perpetuate each other."163 Courts, especially constitutional
courts, are uniquely placed in their capacity either to shape and
transform prevailing social attitudes, or to contribute to the perpetuation of violence through the reliance on seemingly neutral legal
principles. 164 The Russian Constitutional Court has so far perpetuated the discourse of masculinity through gender stereotyping and
insistence on "traditional values" when defining the contours ofhuman
rights. 165 The case of Markin v. Russia provides a good illustration
158. Id.
159. Liiri Oja & Alicia Ely Yamin, "Woman"in the European Human Rights System:
How Is the Reproductive Rights Jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights
Constructing Narratives of Women's Citizenship? 32 CoL. J. GENDER & L. 62, 67 (2016).
160. See generally id.
161. ld. at 74.
162. ld.
163. Timmer, supra note 108, at 239.
164. A.V. Orlova, "Public Interest," Judicial Reasoning and Violence of the Law:
Constructing Boundaries of the "Morally Acceptable," 9 CONTEMP. READINGS L. & Soc.
JUST. 51, 51 (2017).

165. Alexandra V. Orlova, Privatizing Homosexuality: Russia's Reassertion of 'Moral
Sovereignty' over Gay Rights, 11:2 HUMAN RIGHTS & INT'L LEGAL DISCOURSE 126 (2017).
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of conflicting judicial narratives, with the ECtHR attempting to
name and dismantle existing gender stereotypes, and the Russian
Constitutional Court actively trying to support and reinforce them. 166
The two major stereotypes that the Russian Constitutional Court
relied upon in its reasoning were that women do not play an important role in the military, and that women have a special role associated with motherhood. 167 Hence, the Russian Constitutional Court's
reasoning continues to provide grounds for the Russian state to
rationalize and justify gender discrimination. 168 The connection between stereotyping and discrimination is key.
In order to effectively address discrimination, various premises
of myths and stereotypes about women need to be openly acknowledged and discussed. 169 The case of Markin v. Russia illustrates the
limited capacity of the Russian Constitutional Court to engage in
transformative legal reasoning, as well as its active opposition to the
ECtHR's reasoning. 170 Thus, while foreign legal reasoning gets framed
as "legal colonialism" by the Russian state, domestic legal reasoning
is utilized to maintain a particular version of state masculinity. 171

B. Entrenching Patterns of Gendered Violence
From the review of the Markin v. Russia and Pussy Riot cases,
it becomes apparent that the Russian judicial system supports and
reinforces the state's politics of masculinity by "evoking traditional
notions of family, marriage, and femininity." 172 The politics of masculinity, often actualized through the rhetoric of"traditional values"
and presented as resistance to corrupt Western influences, are contributing to the perpetuation of and further entrenchment of patterns of gender violence. One recent troubling development is the
February 2017 amendment to s.116 of the Criminal Code of the
166. Compare Markin v. Russia, 2012-111 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 104, with Rutland, supra
note 50, at 581.
167. Marina L. Shelutto, Realizatsiya Konstitutsionnyh Printsipov Semeinogo Prava
v Rossiiskom Zakonodatelstve, ZHURNAL ROSSIISKOGO PRAVA 56, 58 (2013) (Russ.).
168. Timmer, supra note 108, at 284.
169. Id.
170. In a way, Russian courts and judges are constrained by pressure from the state
and lack of appropriate "checks and balances." The judiciary has engaged in some passive
forms ofresistance to state's morality politics through the explicit adoption ofWestem-style
reasoning frameworks, such as proportionality analysis. See Orlova, supra note 165, at 173.
171. Whitmore, supra note 81; see Orlova, supra note 165, at 140; see also Dmitri M.
Ilyaguev, ProtivorechiePolozheniiDeistvueschego Zakonodatelstvai Konstitutsii Rossiiskoi
Federatsii: Voprosy Voinskoi Obyazannosti I Ugolovnoi Otvetstvennosti ili Gendernyi
Immunitet, PRoBELYV ROSSIISKOM ZAK.ONODATELSTVE 37, 40 (2012) (Russ.).
172. Diane Crocker, Regulating Intimacy: Judicial Discourse in Cases o{Wife.&sault
(1970 to 2000), 11 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 197, 198 (2005).
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Russian Federation decriminalizing certain forms of domestic violence.173 Section 116 deals with physical assault, defined as ''battery
or similar violent actions, which have caused physical pain but have
not amounted to light injury." 174 This provision was one of the few
available to prosecute domestic violence. 176 Initially, non-aggravated
battery under s.116 was a crime punishable by a fine or restrictions
ofliberty. 176 In 2015, a bill decriminalizing non-aggravating battery
was introduced by the Russian Supreme Court as part of a broader
effort to liberalize Russian criminal law, and reduce the number of
imprisoned individuals. 177 However, the Supreme Court's bill was
amended after its first reading in the lower house of Russia's
legislature-the State Duma-to state that battery of"close persons"
(i.e., domestic violence) would not be decriminalized and would remain
punishable under s.116 of the Criminal Code. 178 The feminist lobby
was ''blamed" for this amendment, "carving out'' the exception forcertain forms of domestic violence. 179 The Russian conservative lobby,
headed by Duma deputy Yelena Mizulina (who also successfully lobbied for the passage of a law banning so-called "gay propaganda"),
claimed that criminalizing domestic violence not resulting in injuries,
was a measure that could potentially criminalize actions of parents
who hit their children as part of discipline, while individuals inflicting
similar harm on strangers would not be criminally liable. 180 Mizulina
stated, "[y]ou don't want people to be imprisoned for two years and
labeled a criminal for the rest of their lives for a slap." 181 The conservative lobbyists viewed criminalization of domestic violence as governmental intervention into family life and private matters. 182 Hence,
in February 2017, s.116 of the Russian Criminal Code was amended
173. Federal'nyi Zakon o vnesenii izmeneniya v stat'yu 116 Ugolovnogo kodeksa
Rossiyskoy Federatsii [Federal Law on Amending Article 116 ofthe Criminal Code of the
Russian Federation], ROSSIISKAIA GAZETA [ROS. GAZ.] Feb. 7, 2017.
174. Id.
175. Nerses Isajanyan, Russian Federation: Decriminalization of Domestic Vwlence,
LAWLIBR. CONGRESS 1, 2 (June 2017).
176. Id. at 3.
177. See Decision of the Plenary Meeting of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation No. 37, July 31, 2015.
178. However, the Supreme Court's bill was amended after its first reading in the
State Duma to state that battery of"close persons" (i.e., domestic violence) would not be
decriminalized and would remain punishable under s.116 of the Criminal Code. Isajanyan,
supra note 175, at 3.
179. Isajanyan, supra note 175, at 3.
180. Feliz Solomon, Vladimir Putin Signed Off on the Partial Decriminalization of
Domestic Abuse in Russia, TIME (Feb. 8, 2017), http:l/time.com/4663532/russia-putin-de
criminalize-domestic-abuse [https://perma.cc/8RWM-43JY].
181. DariaLitvinova,lfHeBeats Yau,ItMeansHeLoues You,MoscowTIMES (Aug. 5,
20 16), http://themoscowtimes.com/articles/if-he-beats·you-it-means·he-loves-you-54866
[https://perma.ccfK2D5-KESF] .
182. Isajanyan, supra note 175, at 4.
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to remove the following language: "battery of close persons that resulted in physical pain but did not inflict harm or other consequences"
from the purview ofcriminallaw. 183 As a result of the 2017 amendments, only aggravated battery, repeated battery, or battery that results in harm to the victim's health, remain criminally punishable. 184
Domestic violence that does not result in injuries was relegated
to an administrative offence, and could be prosecuted through "private prosecutions," leaving the victim responsible for collecting evidence and bringing the case forward. 185 Repeated offences do remain
criminalized; however, if a person commits the same crime after a
year has passed, that crime would be construed as an administrative
offense. 186 Vyacheslav Volodin, the speaker of the Duma, stated that
the purpose of the bill was to help build "strong families." 187 While
official statistics on domestic violence are not kept in Russia, 188
according to the Russian Ministry of the Interior, forty percent of
violent crimes happen within the family, 189 with women accounting
for seventy-four percent of Russia's victims. 190 According to some
estimates, approximately 14,000 Russian women die annually due
to domestic violence. 191 While the deaths of 15,000 Soviet soldiers
during the Afghan war is considered to be a national tragedy, no similar public outcry exists when it comes to gender violence. 192
Russia's #IAmNotAfraidToSpeak. flash mob demonstrated not
only the ever-prevalent nature of gendered violence, but also the
fear of allowing corrupt police and the judiciary to handle such cases,
as law is frequently viewed by victims "as a tool of repression rather
than of liberation."193 Thus, instances of domestic violence are frequently not reported to the police. 194 In tum, patterns of violence are
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Surya Rajkumar, The Regressive Russian Amendment, LsE HUM. RIGHTS BLOG
(June 5, 20 17), http://blogs.lse.ac. uk/humanrights/20 17/06/05/the-regressive-russians
-amendment [https://perma.cd"4QL6-MPZT].
186. ld.
187. The Duma's War on Women: Why Russia is About to Decriminalise Wife-Beating,
ECONOMIST (Jan. 28, 2017), http://www.economist.com/europe/2017/01/28/why-russia-is
-about-to-decriminalise-wife-beating [https://perma.ccfl'2WL-FAWE] [hereinafter The
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137, 137 (2012) (Russ.).
189. The Duma's War on Women, supra note 187.
190. Solomon, supra note 180.
191. Dianne Post, Women's Rights in Russia: Training Non-Lawyers to Represent
Victims of Domestic Violence, 4 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L. J. 135, 136 (2001).
192. Id.
193. I d. at 146; see also The Duma's War on Women, supra note 187.
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established and legitimated, 195 in part due to the state's refusal to
take active measures to prevent and prosecute such violence. 196 This
structural nature of gender violence is further reinforced through
state policies (such as amendments to decriminalize domestic violence
that do not result in physical injuries), the media, and the education
system. 197 The decriminalization of certain forms of domestic violence means that the gap between real and reported violence will
grow even more. 198
Violence against women is certainly not a new phenomenon in
Russia. 199 However, during Soviet rule, this issue was relegated to
the private realm, and was classified as a "family affair," not fit for
public debate.200 In view of the formal gender equality proclaimed by
the Soviet state, to admit that domestic violence posed a serious issue,
would challenge certain underlying premises of communism. 201 Some
of the more egregious cases of domestic violence were typically prosecuted under the offense of hooliganism. 202 Using the charge of hooliganism allowed for simple policy explanations, such as alcohol
dependence and crowded living conditions, to address the issue of
why domestic violence was taking place, while ignoring the structural conditions of patriarchy and gender discrimination. 203 In today's Russia, when it comes to domestic violence, police only get
involved in the most severe instances of physical violence, discounting all other instances. 204 Women are frequently blamed for provoking such violence, and are relegated to the category of victims less
deserving of protection, as opposed to children and the elderly. 205
Hence, as in Soviet times, despite greater public awareness of gender
GoSUDARSTVENNOGO UNIVERSITETA 52 (2013) (Russ.); see also Aleksei M. Badonov,
Domashnee Nasilie Kak Instrument Vlasti v Sem'e, 2 VLAST 11 (2017) (Russ.).
195. Soshnikova & Sherpaev, supra note 188, at 138.
196. See Badonov, supra note 194, at 111.
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Postanovke Problemy, 4 VESTNIK MAIKOPSKOGO GOSUDARSTVENNOGO TEHNICHESKOGO
UNIVERSITETA 10 (2010) (Russ.).
198. Anastasia Manuilova, Nine Months after New Domestic Vwlence Law, Russian
Women Still Struggle, Moscow TIMES (Nov. 24, 2017 5:11PM), http://themoscowtimes
.com/articles/nine-months-on-russian-women-grapple-with-new-domestic-violence-laws
-59686 [https://perma.cc/VEJ3-653D].
199. Post, supra note 191, at 135.
200. Id. at 135-36.
201. Marianna Muravyeva, Bytovukha: Family Violence in Soviet Russia, 8 ASPASIA
93, 93 (2014).
202. Id. at 97.
203. Id. at 100, 109.
204. Seeid.
205. Andrew Stickley et al., Risk Factors for Intimate Partner VwlenceAgainst Women
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violence in general, and domestic violence more specifically, 206 domestic violence is still "privatized" and conceptualized as a "family affair''
by the authorities.207 Russian research dealing with domestic violence, in a similar vein to Soviet research, also tends to concentrate
on immediate precipitating factors of gender violence, such as alcohol
abuse and living in crowded conditions, rather than engage in an
examination of deeper structural factors. 208 Even more troubling,
surveys of attitudes toward domestic violence have found that males
in the eighteen to thirty age category demonstrate significant support of a husband's right to use violence within the family. 209 Such
tolerant attitudes toward domestic violence are in part a response
to a "patriarchal-nationalist upsurge that espouses the return of
women to the home, and a renewed stress on women's 'natural predestination' as wives and mothers." 210
It is clear that the Russian state's lack of comprehensive action
towards cases of gender violence "fosters an environment of impunity" and promotes the perpetuation of violence against women. 211
Moreover, regressive legislative measures, such as the amendment
to s.116 of the Russian Criminal Code, and the 2013 federal anti-gay
propaganda law, as well as sustaining gender stereotyping and
discouraging female dissenters through judicial reasoning, effectively sanction the continuation of violence and perpetuation of
structural barriers to gender equality.212 The Russian state's failure
to protect women from violence constitutes a form of gender discrimination, and arguably "denies women their right to equality before
the law," as well as violating their right to life. 213 IDtimately, gender
violence is about more than its immediate impact on individual women
or punishment for individual perpetrators. A deeper re-examination
of the impact of Russia's politics of masculinity has to take place
within the framework of human rights protections.214
206. See Andrew Stickley et al., Attitudes Toward Intimate Partner Vwlence Against
Women in Moscow, Russia, 23 J. FAM. VIOLENCE 453, 453 (2008) [hereinafter Intimate
Partner Violence].
207. See Schenina, supra note 205, at 223.
208. Stickley et al., supra note 205, at 489--90; see also Intimate Partner Violence,
supra note 206, at 454.
209. Intimate Partner Vwlence, supra note 206, at 454; see also Stickley et al., supra
note 205, at 492.
210. Intimate Partner Violence, supra note 206, at 454 (citation omitted).
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Its Application in Canada, 30 WINDSOR Y.B. ACCESS JUST. 49, 49 (2012).
212. Seeid.
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Rights and Violence Against Women, 21 CARDOZO J.L. & GENDER 393, 406 (2015).
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CONCLUSION

The Russian state's deliberate pursuit of the politics of masculinity, steeped in gendered discourses and designed to uphold and
perpetuate gender stereotypes and silence dissenting voices, not
only has the effect of sanctioning violence against women but also
serves to reinforce numerous structural barriers that continuously
relegate women into the private sphere. Constant emphasis on the
role of women as wives and mothers is designed to perpetually focus
on women's biological capacity, and thus relieve the state from its
obligation to consider gender equality seriously and to enforce
women's rights, rather than treat those rights as "moral choices." 215
The Russian state has actively suppressed or deliberately discredited feminist dissenting voices, especially when those voices aim to
serve as "translators" of Western feminist values by vernacularizing
those values for a Russian audience. 216 Social movements have the
potential to influence state decision-makingprocesses regarding which
rights should be recognized and when such a recognition should
occur. Not surprisingly, authoritarian states tend to suppress dissenting social movements when the state's intent is to deliberately
deny certain rights, such as gender equality. 217 Connecting domestic
dissent to broader international support for women's rights could
increase women's vulnerability, given the misogynist backlash it
may trigger. 218 The women of Pussy Riot were cynically used by the
Russian state to illustrate the state's intolerance for Western human rights campaigns and Russian human rights activists who
engage in them. Thus, without the state's backing, feminist ideas and
ideals will remain just that. llitimately, what many Russian feminist movements fail to demonstrate is that creative forms of women's
activism are not expressions of"Westernization," but rather of"the
universal right of women to engage in self-expression." 219
In the long run, the realization of rights, including gender equality, rests on their public acceptance. 22°Formalized legal norms, even
if they are constitutionally enshrined, can be largely disregarded
and disobeyed, especially when both the state and the judiciary are
deliberately perpetuating gender stereotyping and genderized discourses as part of their politics of masculinity directed at the West.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
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In other words, setting something out as a legal norm does not automatically translate into a "real rule" that is popularly accepted. 221
Therefore, to prevent and respond to violence against women, as
well as to combat entrenched gender stereotyping and the state's
resistance to change, measures "must go beyond the state to the
private sphere" to address "deeply entrenched social and cultural
norms, institutionalized in the law and political structures and embedded in local and global economies."222 Development of new "local
norms" based on gender equality has to take place at the local level,
since local norms can be both "paths to change as well as barriers."223
However, in order for these new local norms to take root, the role of
"translators," such as civil society and domestic activists, cannot be
underestimated. 224 In the specific context of Russia, such work of
"translation'' is continuing to prove difficult and is highly discouraged by the state. That said, dissenting voices do continue to accumulate, as illustrated by the '~IAmNotMraidToSpeak" movement,
and hopefully will be able to achieve local critical mass. What is
desperately needed in Russia is sustained opposition constantly
challenging the ideology of masculine dominance and connecting
these challenges to broader human rights principles. 225 However,
while human rights law has the potential to break down the "otherness" of categories, challenging the heterosexual nature of marriage
and women's positioning as "caretakers,"226 the role of law, and
specifically human rights law, appears to be limited in the current
Russian situation. Overall, "[g]iven the reality of male dominance
in state and international institutions, and the manner in which
male traits underpin state relations, it is hardly surprising that the
state is implicated in the maintenance of power structures that
continuously reinforce the oppression of women."227 In order to
advance gender equality, the Russian state will need to deliberately
cede some of its power and account for dissent, which it seems to be
unwilling to do at this moment in time.
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